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Educating Leaders for the Future

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

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Abstract of EDUCATING LEADERS FOR THE FUTURE

An analysis of the War with Iraq produces striking parallels between the course of events of that conflict, and the elements of the Naval War College curriculum. The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the events of the war and the college curriculum to determine if the curriculum is properly preparing the students for service in positions of significantly increased responsibility. The paper reviews the development of political objectives in support of National Security, and the translation of those objectives into clearly defined political objectives through the application of operational art. The issues, concepts, principles, and conduct of the war with Iraq closely reflect the areas and methodology of study in the Naval War College. The College program presents no fixed formula for success, and, therefore, limits the restrictions while broadening the possibilities for solutions to problems. The course provides an excellent transition between assignment at the tactical unit or individual ship level, and assignment at the strategic and operational level. The course enables the student to understand the contribution military power makes to national power, and how to integrate political, economic, and military power. From the initial formulation of the methods of response through the difficulties of war termination, the war is an exciting model of the type of environment for which the college is preparing students.

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EDUCATING LEADERS FOR THE FUTURE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

On the afternoon of February 24, 1991, the United States VII Corps launched an unopposed assault through the Southeastern provinces of Iraq against the Iraqi Army occupying the small country of Kuwait. Twenty-four hours later, the Corps turned East and attacked the highly respected Republican Guard, the best trained and best equipped units in the Iraqi Army. What followed was the largest armored battle since World War II, a battle that saw the complete destruction of the elite Republican Guard, and the total destruction of the half million man Iraqi Army in Kuwait. The Iraqi Army lost over 3,000 tanks. Estimates of Iraqi casualties are somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 killed, and over 100,000 prisoners of war. Allied casualties during the ground war amounted to approximately 59 killed, 78 injured, and less than 20 taken prisoner at the end of the ground battle.

This lightning victory capped a six month period during which American armed forces mobilized reserves, deployed 500,000 troops, and executed a stunning battle plan. The period was marked by a closely coordinated and carefully integrated strategy that has been acclaimed as the most significant American diplomatic and military victory since the end of World War II. In the process, the American military has regained its confidence and won the unquestioned praise and respect of the American people.

The armed forces have validated the long and costly investment in personnel,

technology, training, and doctrine. Central to this "rising from the ashes" of Vietnam, is the emphasis on soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Gone are the category IV soldiers, the criminals escaping prison sentences, and the heavy drug users. Today the military's emphasis is on quality training and education. Ninety percent of today's service members have a high school diploma. Enlisted personnel receive continuous advanced training in job skills and leadership. Officer corps development emphasizes advanced civilian and military education to prepare the officers for increasingly complex and difficult assignments.

At the zenith of a military officer's education is the senior service college. These schools prepare the future senior leadership of the services for duty in complex, difficult, and uncommon assignments of significantly increased responsibility. Officers selected to attend these schools are carefully chosen based on outstanding performance that demonstrates potential for significantly increased responsibility. These officers will be the future senior leaders at the very highest levels of the military services. At these leadership levels, there are no quick, easy answers. There are no rule books or guidelines to tell an officer exactly what should be done in a particular situation. Educational emphasis is placed on the ability to assimilate various elements from differing disciplines into the course of decision making at the senior leadership level.

Purpose

Many of these future leaders have spent the past year in the Naval War College intensely watching the unfolding events in the war with Iraq, feeling that their opportunity to fight in a war has bypassed them. There is a feeling that there are now two kinds of officers in the military, those who served in Saudi Arabia, and those who did not. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that those who were at-

tending the war college were in a unique position to observe the war in a manner that very few officers had an opportunity to do. War college students had the opportunity to study the conduct of the war with Iraq, not just watch it, in a school environment that encouraged the study of war in a curriculum that focused specifically on the issues that were instrumental in the conduct of the war.

Thesis:

The thesis of this paper is that the current Naval War College curriculum is educating the students in the skills that they will need to serve as the future senior leadership of the military. To demonstrate this thesis, and to discuss the ways in which the curriculum prepares students for the increased complexity of higher command and staff duty, this paper will review the war with Iraq, the objectives of the school and its various departments, and then analyze the war in light of that education. Finally, this paper will draw conclusions from the analysis.

CHAPTER II

Operation Desert Shield/Storm

2 August 1990 - 7 November 1990

On August 2, 1990, 80,000 troops of the Iraqi Army invaded, and quickly overran, the small nation of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Crown Prince, Sheik Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, immediately called the American Embassy and asked for military assistance. By this time, Kuwait was lost and the American administration focused on Saudi Arabia. "Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, presented President Bush with draft orders freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States." ¹ The National Security Council met on August 3rd and based their discussion "on the recognition that Iraq's invasion was unacceptable, and if allowed to stand, would fundamentally alter the balance of power in a vital part of the world." ²

The National Security Council approved a plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia, but it depended on Saudi Arabian agreement; armed with this plan, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, traveled to Saudi Arabia to brief King Fahd. President Bush pushed for Mr. Cheney because he knew that it would be more difficult for King Fahd to say no. Following the discussion, Saudi Arabia agreed to the plan, provided the American forces obtain Saudi Arabian approval before initiating an attack, and that those forces would withdraw immediately after the threat was eliminated.

By August 7, 1990 President Bush directed that American forces deploy to Saudi Arabia to defend that country against an expected Iraqi attack. American Naval, Air Force, and Army units began deploying immediately. Simultaneously,

Secretary of State James Baker departed for a series of talks to build the foundation for international support of American actions in the Middle East, and to obtain United Nations backing. The objective of this "shuttle diplomacy" was to build a broad base of support, which would include other Arab nations, to confront the Iraqi aggression. The mix of nations was uncommon, and included Britain, France, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Japan, India, Poland, West Germany, and many others.

The next three months saw the build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia, and the development of careful political objectives enumerated in a number of United Nations resolutions. The public response in support of the deployment of 200,000 American troops continued to mount as Iraq responded by increasing troop deployment into Kuwait. As the Iraqi troop strength increased, rumors of atrocities, raping, and plundering of Kuwaiti riches reached the outside world. Iraq refused to allow foreign workers to leave the country, and began using them as human shields at strategic and military locations. Iraq further strengthened its grip on Kuwait by declaring it a province of Iraq and demanding that all the embassies in Kuwait City close.

In late October, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command, briefed his completed plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia. Additional forces were now needed in response to the increased number of Iraqi troops deployed to Kuwait, and the heavily defended fortifications, reinforced with an extensive barrier system, along the border with Saudi Arabia, and the Kuwaiti coastline.

8 November 1990 - 16 January 1991

President Bush had decided in October to deploy additional forces, but kept that decision a secret until after the American congressional election on 6 November.

This was an important event and he did not want the reaction to his decision to reflect in those elections. On 8 November, the Department of Defense announced that the United States VII Corps, consisting of the 1st Armored Division, 3rd Armored Division, 1st Mechanized Division, and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment would begin deploying to Saudi Arabia .

The response to this decision was sharp. The Allies were stunned at the size of America's additional troop commitment. Congress and the press began asking why the United States was in Saudi Arabia to start with, while the American polls showed similar concern for the action. President Bush began "going the extra mile to avoid a war" by offering to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad and receiving Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Washington. What followed was a month of intense diplomacy, initiated by many Arab nations, the Soviet Union, and the United States in an attempt to resolve the crisis peacefully.

In a meeting on 12 January 1991 with Foreign Minister Aziz, Secretary Baker made one final attempt to convince Iraq of the formidable international resolve and force facing them. Foreign Minister Aziz presented a historical review of Arab grievances with Israel and the United States, and told Baker that the Arab allies would not fight a brother Arab especially if Israel entered the war, concluding, therefore, that the entire alliance was doomed to collapse.

The issue of an Israeli response to a missile attack by Iraq had been discussed with the Arab members of the coalition between September and December. The response received from the Arabs was "generally positive provided Israel didn't attack first and the response was 'proportionate.'" ⁴ President Bush told Israeli President Shamir that the United States had done everything possible to avoid "linkage" of Israel to the war, and that Israel must do the same. Israel agreed to consult with the United States first before responding, and a hotline was estab-

lished between Tel Aviv and Washington, to facilitate coordination.

17 January 1991 - 28 February 1991

The war with Iraq began in the early hours of January 17, 1991, as Allied aircraft struck targets located deep within Iraq, initiating what was to be a thirty-five day air war. The purpose of the air war was to gain air superiority over Iraq, destroy the Iraqi military infrastructure, isolate the battlefield, prevent the resupply of Iraqi Army units in Kuwait, and reduce the fighting strength of the Iraqi units.

The second night of the air war, Iraq launched Scud missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and Israel. The United States assured Israel that they were focusing maximum effort on destroying the launch sites. There was nothing that the Israeli Air Force could do that the Allies were not already doing in large numbers, virtually unopposed.

Allied ground forces continued to deploy to Saudi Arabia, and the United States deployed an additional Marine Task Force. This force conducted a series of amphibious assault training exercises along the coast of Sudan, and participated in a major amphibious assault rehearsal, Imminent Thunder, on the coast of Saudi Arabia, just south of Kuwait. These exercises received extensive media coverage, and Imminent Thunder, itself, was feared by some to be the provocation that would entice Iraq to attack. But, that did not happen.

The Allies quickly achieved air superiority within the first twenty-four hours of the war. Ten days into the air war, with the air under the complete domination of the Allies, Iraq began flying its more capable combat aircraft to neighboring Iran in an apparent attempt to save the aircraft from destruction. The intense bombing of Iraq continued unrelentingly. Concern for Iraqi civilian deaths from the air attacks began to rise in international news, and was heightened when a command bunker,

occupied by Iraqi civilians fleeing the air raids, was struck with devastating results. The outcry against Iraqi civilian suffering intensified.

Iraq employed a new weapon by releasing several million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf, confirming the fears of many environmentalists. The oil fouled the gulf beaches as far South as Saudi Arabia, killed hundred of thousands of marine animals, and threatened the desalination plants in Saudi Arabia that supported the Allied troops and the Saudi population.

Early in February, the Iraqis attacked and seized the unoccupied Saudi city of Khafji located just South of the Kuwaiti border. The Saudi Arabian Army attempted to push the attackers out of the city, but were initially repulsed. After being reinforced with United States Marines, aircraft, and artillery, the city was retaken.

Iran and the Soviet Union each separately attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Iraq in order to avoid the inevitable ground war. Both attempts were unsuccessful, but they raised the question of bombing halts and had to be diplomatically and politically diffused.

The ground war began on February 24, 1991 as the Saudi Arabian Army attacked Northward up the Kuwaiti coast, and the Marine Expeditionary Force penetrated the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border and attacked right where the Iraqis expected. With American naval gunfire support attacking the Kuwaiti coast, the American amphibious assault seemed to be imminent. The remaining Arab Armies attacked directly into the Iraqi defenses along the Kuwaiti border. The war seemed to be going exactly the way Iraq expected it to go.

Unknown to the Iraqis, however, the ground war actually began several days earlier, in what General Schwarkopf called "the Hail Mary pass." Before the air war began, all Allied forces were positioned South of the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border; once the air war began, and Iraq's ability to conduct air reconnaissance was

eliminated, the American XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps shifted West to attack through Iraq itself, and into the rear of the prepared defensive positions of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait. The XVIII Airborne Corps attacked to secure the Western flank, establish forward operating bases along the Tigris-Euphrates valley, and to support the VII Corps main attack. The VII Corps penetrated the thin Iraqi defenses West of Kuwait and conducted a lightning attack deep into Iraq, executed a classic turning movement, and attacked East into the rear of, and defeating, the Republican Guards.

The destruction of the Iraqi Army was complete. Long lines of dejected Iraqi prisoners of war streamed to the Allied rear. Whole units surrendered, were stripped of their weapons, and told to start moving to the rear unguarded. Kuwait City was seized on February 26th, and the Kuwait airport was secured the following day. By the time combat operations ceased on February 27th, the Allies had destroyed 41 of 42 Iraqi divisions, destroyed over 3,000 tanks, and taken over 100,000 prisoners of war.

28 February 1991 - April 1991

President Bush suspended all offensive combat operations on 27 February 1991. He declared that all military objectives had been achieved; Kuwait was liberated, and the Iraqi Army was defeated. Iraq was required to agree to four conditions to ensure that the suspension became a permanent cease-fire: "Release of all prisoners of war and third country nationals, as well as the return of all remains; Release of Kuwaiti detainees; Information on the location and nature of all land and sea mines in Kuwait; and Full compliance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions." ⁵ Additionally, President Bush required that Iraq dispatch military leaders to meet with General Schwarzkopf within 48 hours to arrange the mili-

tary aspects of the cease-fire. The Iraqis complied with the demand and, upon completion of the meeting, agreed to all of the Allied terms necessary to establish a cease -fire.

The United Nations resolutions mandated that Iraq be expelled from Kuwait, but did not demand the unconditional surrender of Iraq, or authorize the seizure of Iraqi territory. The Allies themselves were divided on the termination of the war. The United States, Britain, and France were eager to end the war in order to avoid embittering Arab opinion. They wanted to avoid any appearance that they were bent on revenge, or trying to install a government of their own choosing in Iraq. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait wanted to continue on to Baghdad and overthrow Saddam Hussein.

As the cease-fire went into effect, reports began to surface of large scale uprising in Iraq. The first of these began in the Tigris and Euphrates River area where the Shiite Moslem population harbored a long standing dislike for the Iraqi government. The unrest spread to the port city of Basra, and to the Northern regions of Iraq inhabited by the long suppressed Kurds. A major American concern was not to totally destroy the Iraqi Army, because that would upset the balance of power in the Middle East, but Iraq used what Army remained to put down these revolts by force.

Three months after the end of the war with Iraq, Saddam Hussein is still in power in Iraq. He has crushed all the revolts, and consolidated his power. The Shiites and the Kurds have agreed to negotiations with the Iraq government. Despite this, many Kurds have fled to the mountains along the Turkish-Iraqi border for fear of Iraqi reprisals. Nevertheless, there is a balance of power in the Middle East, and an opportunity for negotiations leading to a long term settlement of many regional issues.

CHAPTER III

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM

School Mission

The Naval War College is the senior educational organization in the Department of the Navy; its mission is:

"...to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in command, staff and management positions; to develop a sound understanding of strategy, to include naval, joint and combined campaigns; and to conduct research leading to the development of advanced strategic warfare and campaign concepts for the future employment of naval forces." ⁶

The school year is divided into three trimesters of complementary study of National Security and Decision Making (NSDM), Strategy and Policy (S&P), and Employment of Naval Forces (OPS). The goal of the college is to provide a challenging environment for the conduct of intensive study into complex problems and decision making issues. The primary objective is "the expansion of logical reasoning capacity and the elements of choice, rather than familiarization with masses of factual material." ⁷ The emphasis is on education not training, and the development of intellectual skills to make the students effective senior leaders.

The College of Naval Warfare is the senior course in the school and its students are composed of senior grade military officers and civilian from the various services. The "program is designed to investigate the political source and implications of military strategy, economic and managerial aspects of force planning, and implementation of naval strategy and operations at the highest command level." ⁸

National Security Decision Making Department (NSDM)

NSDM is an executive development course that emphasizes the preparation of the students for senior level command and staff positions. The department attempts to balance individual reasoning, academic knowledge, and professional experience in the context of a senior-level executive development course. It does not provide fixed answers or approaches to problem solving, but rather encourages the integration of information by the student on an issue by issue basis.

The department looks at the economic, political, and military environments of national security, force planning, and long range planning and programming of forces. It does this within a framework of force related problems, including uncertainty and behavior influence. Finally, the department discusses the issue of management control of large organizations.⁹ The department's overriding approach is "the expansion of the student's personal philosophy of what constitutes an integrative, balanced, executive point of view."¹⁰

The three major subcourses, Force Planning (FP), Defense Analysis (DA), and Policy Making and Implementation (PMI), provide insights into diverse topical areas, but compliment each other in the management skills necessary to make high level decisions. Force Planning focuses on concepts in choosing future force structure. It assesses the economic, political, and military issues affecting national security, and the structuring of the force necessary to support that changing environment. The course challenges the students to think through the impact of the various environments in transition, and to provide concepts for national security in the distant future.

Defense analysis, rather than teach the specific application of given mathematical formulas for the purposes of problem solving, provides the student with the executive level skills for analyzing the input, process, and output of decision making.

DA focuses on understanding the difficulty of clearly defining measures of effectiveness that are true indicators of success through a rational framework. It does not eliminate subjective decision making, but provides a forum to identify it and its impact clearly.

Policy Making and Implementation "increases the student's ability to understand the political, organizational and behavioral phenomena which are relevant to national security decision making in Washington, D.C. at major headquarters, and in operational commands." " PMI provides the student with the ability to understand the bureaucratic functioning of large headquarters and organizations in preparation for command or staff assignment in senior level positions. PMI enables them to analyze the process and the development of contingencies, and to develop an integrated and balanced approach for effective leadership and participation in the organization.

Strategy and Policy (S&P)

The purpose of the Strategy Department is to teach the students to think strategically. The course examines the relationship of a nation's political interest and the military force that may be used to serve that interest. The approach is threefold: first, it studies strategic analysis, then it analyzes historical conflicts, and finally, it requires the student to apply strategic thinking into the future.

The course focuses on six areas of analysis. First is the strategy/policy match, which investigates the extent to which the military means chosen was appropriate for the policy it supported. Next, the adequacy of the strategy is analyzed through the conduct of a rigorous net assessment of the opponents, and the study of the integration and effectiveness of the means chosen. Additionally, the integration of the various forms of warfare (land and naval) is studied to determine what differ-

ence they have on the outcome. Next, the nature of coalition warfare is studied to determine its effectiveness, how it functioned, and why it failed. How the coalition was developed, the degree of influence of each of the members of the coalition, and the behavior of the non-belligerents is investigated.

A major area of study is the relationship of military and civilian leaders, the source and nature of that relationship, and its impact on the outcome, is of extreme importance. Prewar plans, and the results of those plans, are analyzed to determine the adequacy of the plans, and their contribution to the conflict. Special emphasis is given to postwar settlements, and the effect the integration of the various means had on the outcome of the conflict. The resulting postwar order and the extent of stability it provided is analyzed. Finally, the strategic culture of the government is studied to determine the effect it had on the shaping of the means and forms of warfare.

Operations Department (OPNS)

The Operations Department is "an executive development course designed to develop the ability of senior level military officers to think operationally in preparation for major command and staff assignments." ¹² Operations focuses on the use of many disciplines in the course of resolving operational issues, rather than the use of a single, specific discipline. The philosophy of the program is that the senior military officer must have a firm understanding of strategy, operations, and military decision making.

The department studies the operational realities of supporting maritime operations, conducting joint military decision making, and the selection, allocation and tasking of air, land, sea, and space forces. The course also examines the potential forces threatening these joint forces, and it investigates the constraints of interna-

tional law on military decision making.

The Operations Department is divided into four major instructional subcourses: Operations General Sessions (Opns), Strategy and Operations (SO) Military Warfare (WR), and Planning and Decision Making (PD). The general sessions provide case studies that demonstrate the value of the course of study.

Military Warfare enables the student to make decisions on how best to integrate joint and combined forces. It develops "the ability to select, allocate, and task air, land, sea, and space forces to operate in joint or combined operations." ¹³ Additionally, it enables the student to compare tasks of the various services, understand their capabilities and limitations, and how to integrate them to product an effective force. Strategy and Operations joins the ends and the means of military strategy in day to day operations. It is designed to enable students "to think in strategic and operational term" ¹⁴ by understanding strategy and operational art, national military strategy and the various service's warfighting doctrine, and considering their application in war. Planning and Decision Making focuses on military decision making by the commander. It is designed to enhance the student's skills in "developing estimates, plans, and directives" ¹⁵, and understanding of international law.

In summary, the focus is on education, not training, in a balance approach that requires the student to think strategically and operationally at a grand level. There are no right answers, no exact formulas for success. The educational program enables the student to think on a broader scale, as he makes the transition from a series of assignments at the tactical unit level to assignments in higher command and staff positions where his actions and decisions will have a much broader and more enduring effect.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

National Security Decision Making Focus

NSDM begins its course of study by focusing on national policy, and the three sources of power to implement that policy: economic, political, and military. It then investigates how a nation perceives threats to its policy, and how it integrates its power to achieve those policy objectives.

The United States policy that led to the American position over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has its foundation in the United States National Security Strategy. The enduring objectives of that strategy were the basis of the American position, and include: deter aggression; promote a strong American economy; ensure access to foreign markets, energy, and mineral resources; maintain stable regional military balance to deter powers that might seek regional dominance; and promote peace, world order, and political, economic, and social progress.¹⁶

Nations of the world have four basic interests of the state: defense of the homeland, economic well being, a favorable world order, and promotion of own values. A nation views each issue it faces in light of these basic interests, and in varying degrees of importance, from peripheral, to marginal, vital and finally, survival. It is in the latter two degrees of importance that a nation will consider fighting, and that was the case in the American assessment of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Without trying to stretch the point, a major issue between the news media and the military during this war was the effectiveness of the air war. Questions about the number of tons dropped, targets hits, and degree of destruction, became central

to domestic and international support for the war. As demonstrated in DA, it was necessary to separate the objective and subjective measurements of effectiveness, and clearly articulate the issues.

Strategy and Policy Focus

The Strategy and Policy Department studies how nations win wars. It begins by examining how nations develop policy, and determine the strategy to achieve that policy. At the center of this evolution is the Net Assessment. For its policy, the United States developed clear political objectives from the enduring objectives contained in the National Security Strategy: the liberation of Kuwait, the restoration of the Kuwaiti government, the release of third country nationals, and the return of Kuwaiti detainees.

A net assessment of Iraq and the United States reveals the nature of the risks, and opportunities afforded to each during this crisis. Iraq had the fourth largest standing Army in the world, a capable Air Force, and one of the smallest Navies in the world. Iraq's powerful Army drew its strength from the elite Republican Guard, an armored force of five divisions, equipped with the latest Soviet tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, and seasoned by eight years fighting experience during the Iran-Iraq war. While not demonstrating great proficiency in offensive operations, the Iraqi Army demonstrated exceptional skill in the defensive. Iraq also had Scud missiles with a range of 560 miles. These, coupled with the threat of their chemical and nuclear capability, made the Iraqi Armed Forces a substantial threat to her neighbors. Economically, Iraq depended on the flow of oil as a major source of income. This oil was distributed by sea from the ports on the Persian Gulf, and by two pipelines, one through Turkey, and the other to a port on the Arabian Sea. The bulk of goods in Iraq's economy came in to the country by ship

through these same ports, and by truck from Syria and Jordan. Politically, Iraq was isolated. The Soviet Union had become more distant, while relations with Iran, Turkey, Syria, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia were strained, even before the invasion.

The United States possessed a formidable military force supported by extensive prewar plans and a substantial deployment capability tailored for the region. The United States economy, while not as heavily dependent on the region for oil, was closely interwoven with the economies of other nations that were heavily dependent on oil from the region. The ripple effect of an oil price increase would indirectly impact the American economy and push it over the edge into a looming recession. Politically, however, the United States was in a very strong position. The Conventional Forces, Europe (CFE) agreement with the Soviet Union was making good progress, a Nuclear Arms Treaty had just been completed with the Soviet Union, and the United States was enjoying a strong position of influence in the developing East European nations. This, combined with the naked aggression of Iraq, placed the United States in an extremely strong position to act diplomatically to force Iraq out of Kuwait.

Strategy and Policy also studies the adequacy of the strategy-policy match to determine if the strategy will achieve the political objectives the nation has developed. The strategy coordinated by the Bush Administration, aimed at getting Iraq out of Kuwait through economic embargoes, integrated actions to diplomatically isolate Iraq, and military force, if necessary. The strategy emphasized economic and diplomatic actions through the United Nations, while deploying a creditable military force that was capable of deterring an attack on Saudi Arabia, and ultimately ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, as a last resort.

Of particular interest in S&P is the study of coalition warfare. This part of the study investigates the reasons why alliances are formed, and how different nations

employ alliances to achieve their strategic objectives. Such was the case in the war with Iraq. Diplomatic actions began immediately as President Bush personally called many other world leaders to elicit their support. The task of confronting Iraq was going to be a difficult one, requiring the commitment of significant resources. The support of the American public and Congress would not sustain a purely United States force. There would have to be Allies who committed military forces as well as financial and moral support. Secretary of State Baker departed on the first of many rounds of shuttle diplomacy, gathering that support, and integrating the international effort. Eventually, 40 nations contributed to the alliance, from old friends like Britain and France, to Arab allies like Egypt and Morocco, to unlikely supporters like Syria. The military strategy was equally complicated, and required a delicate balance between the employment of American and Allied forces, Arab Host Nation customs, and worldwide political scrutiny.

The last area of this emphasis for this course of study is war termination. To the novice this would appear to be the easiest of challenges for a government to control, but as a war continues, one side begins to lose while the other begins to win. The loser will attempt to gain some measure of success in order to have a stronger position at the bargaining table. The winner, on the other hand, senses the victory and begins to expand its policy objectives beyond those originally established. This is where many nations error. It requires a firm understanding of the objectives of a policy, and great discipline not to expand policy goals towards the latter part of a war. This is the situation that the United States found itself in the late stages of the war with Iraq. The Arab allies wanted to continue the war until the Iraqi capital of Baghdad had been seized. The American goals, and those of the United Nations limited the policy objectives to the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait. To change the goal at this late date would have seriously endangered the international and

domestic support that the United States enjoyed. The overthrow of the Iraqi government was not one of the original policy objectives. If that were to happen, it would happen after the war had ended. A much repeated theme of S&P is that no war is final.

Joint Military Operations Focus

The challenge for the American military in Iraq was how to assemble the various joint and combined forces into an effective force capable of defeating Iraq. In the Operations Department there are three focal questions, the answers to which, are essential to translating political objectives into clearly defined military objectives. The questions include: "(1) What military condition must be produced to achieve the strategic goal? (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence?"¹⁷

In the war with Iraq, the military condition, clearly, was the ejection of the Iraqi Armed Forces from the country of Kuwait. The sequence of actions that led to that condition required the consideration of three points: the identification of the enemy centers of gravity, consideration of culmination points, and protection of one's own centers of gravity. For the Iraqi military there were three centers of gravity, the Republican Guards, the Air Forces, and the logistical support of the troops committed in Kuwait. The culmination point is much less easy to identify. The culmination point, that point at which the attrition of combat power reduces the strength of the offensive force so that it has to consider a reorientation of operation,¹⁸ properly conceived, is forecast in advance, and actions are implemented to prevent that reduction of combat power from impeding the execution of the campaign. In the war with Iraq, the culmination point would have come after the engagement of the

Republican Guard when resupply of ammunition, refueling, and casualty evacuation, combined with extended lines of communication, would cause a pause in the fighting.

The final question to be answered for the operational commander is the application of the resources to accomplish the condition. This means more than the most economic or most effective use of resources. It means the integration of assets to maximize the synergistic effect of the resources. In Operation Desert Storm the Allied units were expertly integrated to compliment their various capabilities and limitations. For example, the XVIII Airborne Corps was a light Corps with the mission to screen the left flank of the VII Corps, to secure the Tigris - Euphrates River Valley, and to support the VII Corps attack on the Republican Guards. With the assigned units, 82d Airborne, 101st Airborne, 24th Mechanized Divisions, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, this was a difficult series of tasks. By attaching the French, 6th Light Armor Brigade to the Corps this gave the corps the extra force needed to screen its own left flank, while maintaining its ability to screen forward with the 3rd ACR, and fully support VII Corps with the 24th Mechanized Division.

Likewise, the Tiger Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division was attached to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The MEF lacked the heavily armored M1A1 tank, the organic mechanized infantry fighting vehicles, and the self-propelled artillery, necessary to conduct the kind of aggressive armored attack up the Kuwaiti coastal highway, and the 2nd Brigade provided that capability. The British armored division was integrated into VII Corps for its swift armored attack. The Egyptian and Syrian divisions, whose governments wanted only to attack Iraqi troops in Kuwait and not those in Iraq proper, were employed to attack Iraqi positions in Kuwait. While not a specific military consideration, the political nature of the coalition and the need to maintain domestic support of the American administration's objective,

required that Allied troops be fully integrated in the campaign within the limits of their capabilities, and independent national objectives. Only perceptive commanders, who understood the delicate balance of economic, political, and military strength, could have taken such diverse elements and molded them into such an efficient fighting force.

The traditional functions associated with tactical operations, intelligence, maneuver, fires, sustainment, and deception, remain applicable at the operational level, but on a much larger scale. The operational commander makes very few operational decision once the campaign is initiated. He contributes to the campaign over a long period of time and he shapes the battlefield through the integration of the major operational functions. The operational commander decides when and where to fight the battle, and makes the enemy come to him on his own terms through the application of these functions.

Intelligence at the operational level is critical to the campaign and extremely difficult because it tries to get into the mind of the enemy commander and project into the future, what he will do. At this level, intelligence relies heavily on strategic assets. In Operation Desert Storm, all the national strategic assets were at the disposal of the operational commander. Imagery, HUMINT, SIGINT, and tactical collection means were employed to study the Iraq military system, assess its strengths and weaknesses, and to target critical sites, installations, and facilities. Intelligence was also employed to assess the impact of the embargo and the air war, and to further focus attack efforts.

Operational maneuver secures and retains positional advantage, while maintaining the most direct route from the base of operations. This was accomplished in Kuwait by the swift movement of the attacking corps through Iraq and into the rear of the Republican Guard positions, combined with the simultaneous frontal at-

tack along the entire Kuwaiti border. Once initiated, the ground attack became a war of movement, highlighted by speed, lethality, and combined arms operations, supported by close air support.

Operational fires supporting the campaign plan commenced 35 days in advance of the ground battle. At the operational level, these fires are primarily provided by the air forces, but with the increased range and accuracy of weapons like the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the Multiple Launched Rocket Systems (MLRS), these systems were included in operational fires. These fires are planned to facilitate maneuver, isolate the battlefield, and destroy critical command and control, logistical depots, and large troop concentrations.

Operational sustainment first prepositioned logistical supply bases in Western Saudi Arabia before the ground attack, and then ensured continued sustainment throughout the attack. This was accomplished by integrating sustainment planning into the maneuver plan through the use of air assaults to secure logistical bases deep in Iraq. Detailed planning ensured movement of large volumes of supplies to those bases as the maneuver units seized ground.

Operation Desert Storm contained an extensive deception plan that effectively manipulated the perceptions and expectations of the Iraqi military into expecting a direct assault of their defenses in Kuwait and an amphibious landing. The plan painted a false picture of Allied troop concentrations and focused on the country of Kuwait proper, while concealing the true intent, a classic turning movement. The plan was carefully targeted at Saddam Hussein, his military command system and its decision making system. Understanding the high degree of centralized control, Desert Storm attacked critical command, control, and intelligence collecting assets early in the ground war to blind the Iraqis and prevent effective command and control.

The timing of the deception plan was carefully synchronized. The ground forces were initially employed directly across the Kuwaiti border in front of the Iraqi Army. When the Allied air forces achieved air superiority, and eliminated Iraqi aerial reconnaissance capability, the ground forces demonstrated great agility by shifting quickly to the West. The large logistical effort to support that move included building a road network in the desert, stockpiling logistical supplies, and coordinating transportation assets, including Host Nation support, to move two army corps quickly.

Throughout Desert Storm, the deception plan was continually supported. Imminent Thunder underscored the viability of an amphibious assault, and the disposition of Allied ground troops made a ground assault into Kuwait appear plausible. The deception made sense, met Allied capabilities, and seemed worthwhile. More importantly, the deception confirmed Iraq's own expectations. From the day they began to invade Kuwait, Iraq expected an amphibious assault, and the deception plan did not attempt to alter this perception, but to feed it.

The skillful application of operational art significantly contributed to America's success in the war with Iraq. Only through a clear understanding of the interaction of the elements of national policy, the application of military strategy to support that policy, and an understanding of operational art could such a significant victory have been accomplished. That it was accomplished with such skill, knowledge, and understanding, is a testament to the development and education of today's military leader. The Naval War College, through its rigorous and challenging curriculum, is an essential element in the military's educational system.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The issues, concepts, principles, and conduct of the war with Iraq closely reflect the areas and methodology of study in the Naval War College. From the initial formulation of the methods of response through the difficulties of war termination, the war is an exciting model of the type of environment for which the college is preparing students.

The Naval War College curriculum is focusing correctly on both substance and methodology in its conduct of the College of Naval Warfare program. It is properly preparing officers for future service in positions of significantly increased responsibility. The course presents no fixed formula for success, and, therefore, limits the restrictions while broadening the possibilities for solutions to problems. The limit becomes, not the world of facts and figures, but one of ideas and thought. The course provides an excellent transition between assignment at the tactical unit or individual ship level, and assignment at the strategic and operational level. The course enables the student to think in terms of the long range impact of current decisions in a world of change and uncertainty. The course enables the student to understand the contribution military power makes to national power, and how to integrate political, economic, and military power. Finally the course enables the student to see the line between black and white, not as an impassable definitive line that separates to ideas, but as a wide area of gray where the challenge is to find the idea that connects the two.

NOTES

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. "Military Aims Met" The New York Times, 28 February 1991, p. 12:2.

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7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p.2.
9. College of Naval Warfare, Naval War College, National Security and Decision Making Syllabus, (Newport: 1 August 1990), p. 1.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p.C-1.
12. College of Naval Warfare, Naval War College, Syllabus/Study Guide for Joint Military Operations, (Newport: 1991), p. viii.
13. Ibid., p. 108.
14. Ibid., p. 25.
15. Ibid., p. 161.

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